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I.

THE INTERSECTION (MULTI-CAR COLLISION?) OF RELEVANCE,
CHARACTER EVIDENCE, HEARSAY, AND AUTHENTICATION IN THE
“SOCIAL NETWORKING” ERA
A.

Hypothetical Fact Patterns

Scenario 1: Employee Alleges Harassment by Her Co-Worker
The alleged harasser, Alan, and the plaintiff, Vicky, were co-workers at XYZ, Inc. They
had been acquaintances at work for approximately a year before Vicky went to her supervisor to
complain of sexual harassment by Alan. Vicky wishes to introduce evidence at trial that Alan
harassed her by posting repeated and unwelcome comments under several photos that she had
uploaded to her Facebook page, such as “nice shoes,” 2 “looking so hot,” and “why don’t you
wear that to work?”
She also claims that Alan posted inappropriate comments to her “Facebook Wall”
regarding the music she listens to. In reference to her listing the popular Rihanna song “Rude
Boy,” Alan sent Vicky a Facebook message that “[I am] big enough and can get it up.”
Alan also allegedly printed out and showed several pictures of Vicky to other male
employees of XYZ. The photos show Vicky wearing a short red dress at a party, wearing a
bikini during her vacation to Cancun, and riding a mechanical bull at a bar. After Vicky learned
of this, because the other co-workers started commenting on how she looked in a bikini—and
how she’d look without it—she “de-friended” Alan.
Vicky admits that she was Facebook “friends” with Alan, but claims that she accepted his
“friend request” soon after she met him and that it would have been extremely rude to deny his
friend request at that time. Alan claims that he was just flirting and joking with Vicky and that
he thought it was welcomed by her. He claims that Vicky could have “de-friended” him or asked
him to stop earlier.
In response to Vicky’s complaint, their supervisor called them both in and told them to
“be professional at work” and “keep their personal lives personal.” Vicky does not feel that this
was an adequate response. She felt insulted, and that Alan “got away” with his actions. She
wanted Alan to be transferred, or at least disciplined in some way.
Scenario 2: Employee Alleges Harassment by Her Supervisor
Art is the supervisor of the plaintiff, Vicky, at XYZ, Inc. Art had been Vicky’s
supervisor for approximately two years and had been her primary performance evaluator before
Vicky filed a sexual harassment complaint against him to HR. Vicky wishes to introduce
evidence at trial that Art repeatedly harassed her at work by making lewd comments about what
she was wearing in the photos she posted to Facebook. Several times, Art told Vicky that he
2

This comment is ambiguous on its face. It might mean “nice shoes” or it might be a nod to one of the reputedly
worst pick-up lines, “Nice shoes, wanna f___?” In the picture to which it was posted, Vicky was in her bathing suit
and barefoot.
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would like better a certain outfit she was wearing at work “if she hiked up her skirt a bit,” or “if
she wore high heels instead of flats,” like she had worn shorter dresses and high heels in a couple
of the photos on Facebook.
Vicky and Art were never Facebook “friends,” but Vicky states that Art would come to
her desk during the lunch hour and look over her shoulder while she was viewing her Facebook
account. While he was doing this, he would occasionally place his hands on her shoulders and
give her a hasty massage. She didn’t say anything the first time, because she knew she wasn’t
supposed to be on Facebook on the company computer. The second time it happened, she
objected, and he told her she’d “better not complain,” because she had violated company rules.
When a female co-worker and friend of Vicky was viewing Vicky’s page on her
company computer, Art took over the mouse and zoomed in on Vicky’s bust and derriere in the
photos taken and said “Ooh boy, looky at that package! I’d like to get some of that! You think
they sell that on e-Bay?”
According to some workers, Art would often ask other employees who were “Facebook
friends” with Vicky to bring up her profile so that he could view pictures of her partying on the
weekends. When this came to Vicky’s attention, she became very uncomfortable at work and
went to HR to complain.
Vicky also wishes to testify that one of her co-workers told her that Art said to the coworker that he didn’t know why Vicky was so “holier than thou,” because she listened to “slutty
music,” like Rihanna’s “Rude Boy.” Vicky claims that Art himself would sing or hum, in her
presence in the workplace, certain songs that feature misogynistic and sexual lyrics.
In response to Vicky’s complaint, the head of HR told her that he had “spoken to” Art
and told him to “grow up and get out of middle school,” but that his best advice was for Vicky to
“ignore it, consider the source, and get your work done.” Vicky alleges that after this, Art’s level
of harassment increased to such an unbearable level that she was forced to quit her job. She felt
that HR could not be effective at controlling Art.
Vicky and Art have a mutual male acquaintance (not an XYZ employee) who is willing
to testify that he once attended a party at Art’s home, and that Art was showing sexually explicit
“home movies” in his den, and making passes at all the women present.
B.

Evidence Questions Raised by the Hypotheticals

All evidentiary issues boil down to three questions:
1. Rule 401: Is the evidence relevant to the case?
2. Do any more specific rules of evidence (e.g., the propensity rule; the hearsay
rule; privileges; or the rules regarding subsequent remedial measures or
compromise negotiations) exclude the evidence?
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3. Rule 403: Should the trial court exercise its discretion to exclude the evidence for
reasons of efficiency or the likelihood of unfair prejudice?
The hypothetical fact patterns above raise interrelated questions of relevance, character
evidence, hearsay, nonhearsay, authentication, and the degree of likelihood of unfair prejudice.
Should the employer wish to prove postings on Vicky’s Facebook page, for example, all of these
areas of evidence law would be implicated.
II.

GENERAL RELEVANCE RULES: RULES 401-403
A.

Rules 401-402

By virtue of Rules 401-402, the threshold question for any evidence is whether the
evidence is relevant to a “fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” I.e.,
would the evidence help – in even the smallest way – to prove or disprove any such fact?
This hurdle is not very high: it will be met if the evidence has any probative value
regarding a fact that matters with regard to the issues, under the law and the pleadings, in the
case.
● In Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008), an ADEA
case, the Court held that discriminatory action by other supervisors, against other
employees than the plaintiff is not per se irrelevant, and its admissibility must be
determined on a case by case basis under Rules 401 and 403.
● Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam) (vacating and
remanding the 11th Circuit’s decision on relevance):
[T]here was evidence that Tyson’s plant manager, who made the disputed
hiring decisions, had referred on some occasions to each of the petitioners as
“boy.” Petitioners argued this was evidence of discriminatory animus. The
Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that “[w]hile the use of ‘boy’ when
modified by a racial classification like ‘black’ or ‘white’ is evidence of
discriminatory intent, the use of ‘boy’ alone is not evidence of discrimination.”
Although it is true the disputed word will not always be evidence of racial
animus, it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is always benign. The
speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection,
tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage. Insofar as the Court of
Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications are necessary in all instances to
render the disputed term probative of bias, the court’s decision is erroneous.

Q1:

Is the Rule 401-402 requirement met by evidence of a sexual harassment
plaintiff’s social interaction and sexual conduct, off work-site, with people
who are not employed by and have no connection with the defendant?
● If it is offered to show whether she welcomed the alleged harasser’s conduct, it
likely meets Rule 401. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
68-69 (1986) (question is whether sexual harassment plaintiff “by her conduct
3

indicated that the alleged advances were ‘unwelcome,’” and on this point her
“sexually provocative speech or dress” is “obviously relevant”; court of appeals
erred in holding that there was a “per se rule against admissibility” of evidence of
such matters).
● If the evidence is to be excluded, its exclusion would have to be based on a more
specific relevance rule, Rule 412, which was amended post-Meritor.
Q2:

Is the Rule 401-402 requirement met by off-worksite conduct by the alleged
harasser, including his choice of provocative music, X-rated movies, reading
materials, etc., that have nothing directly to do with the plaintiff?
● Such evidence would pass the low bar created by Rules 401-402.
● If it is to be excluded, its exclusion would have to be based on a more specific
relevance rule, the “propensity rule” codified in Rule 404, or, if it passes the
admissibility test on other acts evidence to show intent under Rule 404(b), its
exclusion would have to be based on Rule 403.

B.

The “Clean-Up Batter”: Rule 403

Rule 403 provides that the court, in its discretion, may exclude relevant evidence if the
court makes a finding (under Rule 104(a)) that the evidence’s “probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.”
The 403 considerations may be summarized as: How much probative value does this
evidence add to the case? Does it carry a high risk of unfair prejudice? Is it worth the time
it will take or the distraction it may cause?
Many “rules” established by the employment discrimination case law result from a Rule
403-type analysis.
For example, under the “stray remarks” doctrine, the courts weigh the probative value
of the remark against the risk that its admission would unfairly prejudice the fact-finder against
the employer. Thus, generally, the courts consider the following when evaluating the relevance
of “stray remarks” to an allegedly discriminatory employment decision:
(a)

Whether the disputed remark was made by the decision-maker (not merely an
agent of the employer uninvolved in the challenged decision);

(b)

Whether the disputed remark was isolated or part of a pattern of biased
comments;
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(c)

Whether the disputed remark was made close in time to the challenged decision;
and

(d)

Whether the disputed remark was ambiguous or clearly reflective of
discriminatory bias.

See, e.g., Annot., 155 A.L.R. Fed. 283 (ADEA cases); Tooson v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
47 Fed. Appx. 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2002); McMillan v. Massachusetts SPCA, 140 F.3d 288, 300
(1st Cir. 1998).
Q3:

Should evidence of the alleged harasser’s reading materials, etc. be
admissible on the issue of his intent when making comments to the plaintiff?
Assuming that the evidence passes Rule 404, should it be excluded under
Rule 403?
● Is the evidence’s probative value that it “adds to the pot” significant? Are his
interests unambiguous? Undisputed? If either of the latter, is the proffered
evidence worth the time? Likely to result only in unfair prejudice against the
employer?

Cf. United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (defendant’s reading material
regarding sex with children was relevant to his intent to commit sex crime against a minor, when
defense was that he thought person who would meet him was an adult); Morse, Maryland
Women is Convicted of Killing, Freezing Adopted Girls, BALT. SUN, Feb. 23, 2010, at A3
(“Prosecutors . . . described how police found a lengthy printout of testimony from a D.C. child
abuse case in [defendant] Bowman’s house. Prosecutor John Maloney suggested that she was
preparing her defense should her crimes be discovered. ‘Who has night reading of grand-jury
testimony, over an inch thick, from a D.C. child abuse case?’ Maloney asked jurors, holding up
the court document.”); Note, Books as Weapons: Reading Materials and Unfairly Prejudicial
Character Evidence, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 257 (2009); Note, The Admissibility of an
Accused’s Choice of Reading Material as Evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b):
What Are the Constitutional Implications of This Type of Evidence?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 349 (2008).
III.

CHARTS OF SPECIFIC RULES REGARDING CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND
EVIDENCE OF OTHER ACTS

As the following charts illustrate, character evidence may be offered either as
substantive evidence (Rules 404-406 and 412-415) or only as to credibility (impeachment or
rehabilitation, Rules 608-609, and 806).

5

CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULES ROAD MAP
Substantive Evidence: Helps to Actually
Prove Who Did What

Character as to Truthfulness Only:
Credibility Evidence Goes Only to Weight
to be Given Substantive Evidence

1. General rule of exclusion: the “propensity
rule” (1st parts of 404(a) & (b))

1. 608(b): ”prior bad acts” for which the
witness (or hearsay declarant) was not
convicted, but which are probative of
untruthfulness

2. Exceptions to propensity rule
a. 406: individual’s repeated, specific
habit/routine of a business

2. 608(a): character witnesses to give opinion
or reputation evidence re: a witness’s or a
hearsay declarant’s character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness (on cross,
character witness’s awareness of specific
instances of principal witness may be
inquired into, but only for limited purpose
of impeaching the character witness, 405)

b. 413-415: sexual assault defendants’
other acts of sexual assault/child
molestation (only 415 applies in civil
cases)
c. 412: sexual offense/harassment victims’
prior sex with defendant

3. 609: prior convictions of the witness or of a
hearsay declarant

d. 404(a)(1) & (2): only criminal cases and
only when accused opens door

4. 806: impeachment of hearsay declarants
3. Purposes other than proving propensity
a. 404(b): limited permissible purpose of
Methods of Proving Character When It Is
Admissible
evidence of a person’s “other acts”,
subject to 403 (see also 105 as to limiting
instruction):
405: Generally, opinion or reputation
- Motive
testimony OK. But see 412.
- Intent
Specific acts maybe proved only under
- Knowledge
- Opportunity
404(b), 608(b), or 609 (or under 405(b),
- Absence of mistake or accident
in rare cases where character is an
“essential element” of the claim or
- Preparation
- Common scheme/plan
defense, i.e., character is directly at
issue). Otherwise, inquiry into specific
- Identity
instances is permitted only on cross of
b. 405(b): character an essential element
and only to impeach a 404(a) or 608(a)
. . . (party must prove not merely an act,
character witness (reputation or opinion
but character of a person . . .) (applicable
witness).
in very few situations, including
regarding employee’s relevant character
trait when employer is sued for
negligent hiring or retention)
6

JUDGE GRIMM’S CHARACTER EVIDENCE FLOWCHART
Circumstantial proof (i.e. propensity)

Character evidence
[404,405, 608 / 5-404, 5-405, 5-608]

Direct proof (Character at issue)
Use of character evidence to impeach

A

B

General Rule prohibiting
circumstantial / propensity proof of
character. Rule 404.a.
• Evidence of a person’s gen’l
character or a character trait not
admissible to prove action in
conformity therewith.

C
Use of evidence of prior
acts/wrongs/crimes for some purpose
other than proving propensity [404.b]

Exceptions
404.a.1: Criminal cases, D introduces proof of D’s character,
state/gov’t rebuts (i.e., character trait of peacefulness).
• How proven: Opinion or reputation evidence (Rule 405).

404.a.2: Criminal case, D introduces proof of V’s character,
state/gov’t rebuts (character trait of aggressiveness)
• How proven: Opinion or reputation evidence (Rule 405).

404.a.3: Use of character to impeach [607, 608, 609]
• How proven: Opinion or reputation evidence (Rule 405).

405: Direct proof of character when it is “at issue” in a case
[seduction cases, negligent entrustment, defense of truth in
defamation case]
• How proven: Opinion, reputation evidence, or specific acts
(Rule 405).

406: Habit or business routine
(Rule 406)

• Motive
• Intent
• Knowledge
• Opportunity

• Absence of mistake
• Preparation
• Common scheme/plan
• Identity

D
How to prove character in cases when it
is admissible [405].
1. Opinion testimony (compliance
w/701, 702 req’d)
2. Reputation testimony (Hearsay, but
803(21) allows it).
3. Specific acts – only if character is
at issue, and direct proof is
permissible. (Otherwise, only on
cross to impeach reputation or
opinion witness. LMcL)

LMcL

Diagram © the Hon. Paul W. Grimm
412-415: Special roles in rape and other sexual assault cases
LMcL

Analysis of Diagram.
The. Hon. Paul W. Grimm
A➜
Is the proposed use of evidence to prove propensity / circumstantial proof of character, as described in A?
IF YES ➜
Then it is NOT admissible unless one of the exceptions in B applies. If one of the exceptions in B
applies, character may only be proved in one of the ways permitted in D.
IF NO ➜
Then is use of proposed evidence relevant for some non-propensity purpose as described in C?
IF NO ➜
Evidence is not admissible.
IF YES ➜
Evidence is admissible for non-propensity purpose subject to 403 balancing, and a
limiting instruction under Rule 105. And any otherwise admissible evidence of the prior
crime, wrong, or act may be admitted.
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IV.

SUBSTANTIVE USE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE: RULES 404-406 AND 412415
A.

“Me, Too”

Q4:

Suppose for example, that plaintiff Vicky wants to introduce evidence that
Alan (or Art) had also harassed others? Or that others had at least alleged
that Alan (or Art) had harassed them? And he denies it?
● Now it’s generally a Rule 401/Rule 404/Rule 403 issue. Rules 415 and 406
come into play only in very limited circumstances.

B.

Rule 415: Other Sexual Assaults by the Alleged Harasser

Rule 415 will apply, to permit the evidence (subject to Rule 403) only if the prior events
were sexual assaults, as defined in Rule 413(d) (see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2245).
The Congressional analysis supporting Rule 415 explained that such evidence
could be considered as evidence that the defendant has the motivation or
disposition to commit sexual assaults, and a lack of effective inhibitions against
acting on such impulses, and as evidence bearing on the probability or
improbability that the defendant was falsely implicated in the offense of which he
or she is presently accused.
137 Cong. Rec. at S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 1991).
Rule 415 tips toward admissibility, but the evidence may be excluded under Rule 403,
when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risks of unfair prejudice, confusion
or distraction of the jury, or by undue consumption of trial time.
● Johnson v. Elk Lake School Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 149-59 (3d Cir. 2002) (no abuse
of discretion in exclusion of evidence, in sexual harassment suit, regarding
touching of another female by defendant, when second female’s testimony was
equivocal as to whether touching seemed intentional).
● Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga.
1996) (in a Title VII sexual harassment suit against a corporate employer, in order
for evidence of defendant’s agent’s prior sexual misconduct to be admissible
under Rule 415, the “evidence of defendant’s agent’s misconduct must be both
probative in that it proves corporate knowledge of similar misconduct and it must
corroborate plaintiff’s story; otherwise, the prejudicial effect on the jury is not
substantially outweighed”).
Rule 415 contains a notice requirement.
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● EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (EEOC
complied with notice requirement under Rule 415 in same-sex sexual harassment
case).
C.

Rule 406: Habit or Business Routine
● Rule 406 will not apply to admit the evidence addressed in Q4 above, because,
even though one might say, colloquially that Alan (or Art) was “in the habit” of
harassing females, his actions are not of the semi-automatic nature embraced by
Rule 406. Examples of Rule 406-type evidence would be, e.g., always smoking
cigarettes to the filter; always putting one’s belt on from left to right; routinely
optically scanning certain records and destroying paper copies. . . .

D.

Rule 404: both the first clause of 404(a) and the first sentence of 404(b) codify
the “propensity rule” of exclusion.

When proof of character is offered merely to show that a person is a “good” or “bad
person, either in general or with regard to a particular trait, and thus as circumstantial
evidence that the person acted “in character” and did the “right” or “wrong” thing in the
incident at issue at trial, it is inadmissible.
● Beware: The protection of the propensity rule may be waived by making a
sweeping claim of innocence in opening statement or by testifying on direct, e.g.,
“I’ve never touched a woman other than my wife.” Such a claim may well open
the door to other acts evidence that would not otherwise have been admissible.
E.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); United States v. Johnson, 634
F.2d 735, 737-38 (4th Cir. 1980).
E.

Rule 404(b): Evidence of “other acts” (either good or bad acts, and either prior
or subsequent to the conduct at issue at trial), is not excluded by the propensity
rule when it has special relevance to a contested, narrower issue in the case, “such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
● Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2003) (evidence of
subsequent “good” act properly admitted to prove non-discriminatory intent); in
ADEA case, evidence was properly admitted that foreman who had fired plaintiff
subsequently hired an employee of the same age as plaintiff).
1.

Intent (a/k/a absence of mistake, accident, or nondiscriminatory purpose)
is critical to the resolution of an employment discrimination claim.

● Johnson v. Hugo’s Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408, 1413 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (no
abuse of discretion to admit evidence of a 1979 consent order on limited question
whether defendant had posted signs or instructed its employers as to
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nondiscriminatory practices, as required by the order; evidence was relevant to
defendant’s motive and intent in actions taken against plaintiffs).
● Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1988) (racial
slurs were relevant to show racial animus; their exclusion was harmless error).
● Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (alleged
harasser’s similar acts with regard to others may be relevant to his or her intent).
● Cf. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1988) (in civil suit for
injuries caused by alleged sexual abuse of child of third marriage, reversible error
to exclude evidence of sexual abuse of defendant’s child by second marriage,
which negated several defenses, including that child plaintiff’s injuries were selfinflicted).
2.

Identity can also be an issue, particularly where the plaintiff needs to
prove from whom harassment, such as hang-up calls or intrusion of her
personal workspace or belongings came.

● Cf. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1988) (in civil suit for
injuries caused by alleged sexual abuse of child of third marriage, reversible error
to exclude evidence of sexual abuse of a defendant’s child by second marriage,
which tended to identify defendants as the abusers since only they had access to
both girls).
Q5:

Is the special relevance requirement of Rule 404(b) met by the evidence
regarding off-worksite conduct by Art at his party?
● In response to an objection, “improper character evidence,” the plaintiff should
respond that the evidence is relevant to Art’s intent in his actions toward her.

F.

Remember Rule 403

Even if evidence is relevant for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), a party may
seek its exclusion under Rule 403.
In making a determination whether to exclude other acts evidence under Rule 403, a
judge should consider questions of the following type:
1.

How compelling is the proof of the other acts?
N.B. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988) held that the
proponent of the evidence must present only enough evidence to permit a
reasonable jury to find, under Rule 104(b), by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the other acts were committed by the person in question.
The trial judge need not be persuaded of the truth of the evidence. (The
10

strength of proof, however, may influence the trial court’s Rule 403
ruling.)
2.

If the other events allegedly happened long ago, how probative are they?

3.

Can the alleged perpetrator be expected to adequately defend against
them?

4.

How long would hearing the evidence on these matters take?

5.

Of how much help will this evidence likely be to the jury in properly
resolving the issue before it?

● See, e.g., Wyatt v. Horkley Self Serve, Inc., 325 Fed. Appx. 488 (9th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (mem.) (evidence was properly admitted as relevant to alleged
harasser’s motive and intent, and plaintiff’s lack of consent).
● Rudin v. Lincoln Land Community College, 420 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2005)
(discussing “direct evidence” of discriminatory intent—an admission that
defendant is acting based on prohibited classification—and “circumstantial
evidence” of discriminatory motivation).
● Gasper v. Ruffin Hotel Corp., 960 A.2d 1228, 1234-37 (Md. App. 2008), cert.
granted, 968 A.2d 1064 (Md. 2009) (no abuse of discretion, in excluding under
the corollary Md. Rule 5-403, evidence of plaintiff’s supervisor’s previous
termination by same employer for sexual harassment, offered as relevant to his
motive and intent in retaliatory discharge of plaintiff, who had complained to him
of sexual harassment by another employee).
Q6:

In response to a Rule 403 objection, should the court admit the evidence
regarding Art’s party at his home?

Q7:

“Me, too.” If Vicky calls other women who worked for Art, either as
employees or providers of contractual services, to show that he also made
inappropriate sexual remarks to them, should this be admitted to show Art’s
intent, over a Rule 403 objection?
● King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301, 308, 310-11 (4th Cir. 2010) (no abuse of
discretion in admitting “me, too” evidence during same time frame of plaintiff’s
employment, both to show that the supervisor’s unwelcoming conduct was due to
plaintiff’s gender and to show that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create
a hostile work environment).

As to the plaintiff’s acts, see, e.g., Stover v. Hattiesburg Public School Dist., 549 F.3d 988, 99394 (5th Cir. 2008) (no abuse of discretion, in case alleging retaliation, to permit plaintiff to be
impeached by evidence that she deleted her work computer files on the day she resigned).
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G.

Limiting Instructions: Rule 105

If the evidence is admitted under Rule 404(b) or for any other limited purpose, a limiting
jury instruction should be given on request.
● United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1088-89 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding no plain
error in trial judge’s failure to sua sponte give limiting instruction regarding
evidence properly admitted under Rule 404(b)).
A jury instruction regarding the limited purpose of evidence admitted under Rule 404(b)
should not be a mere laundry list of categories under that rule; it should be focused, so as to help
the jury to use the evidence only for the proper purpose.
● See, e.g., United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir. 1984) (no error in
admission of other crimes evidence; inter alia, “immediately after receipt of this
testimony before the jury, the court gave an excellent charge instructing the jury
that it could consider such testimony only in trying to determine the defendant’s
motive, intent, knowledge or state of mind and such testimony could not be
considered in determining whether the defendant committed the act or acts
charged in the indictment. This is in keeping with this court’s suggested
procedure. This charge was also repeated in the final jury instructions.”)
(citations omitted).
H.

When, if Ever, is a Person’s “Character” an “Essential Element” of a Claim
or Defense, Under Rule 405(b)?

Rule 405(b) provides that reputation testimony, opinion testimony, and evidence of
specific instances are all admissible to prove a person’s character or character trait, when that
person’s character is an “essential element of a [criminal] charge, [civil] claim, or defense.
. . .” N.B. Character is not an “essential element” just because only persons “of a certain
character” might do an act of the kind charged. See Gibson v. Mayor & Council, 355 F.3d 215,
232-33 (3d Cir. 2004). If proof that the party did the alleged act would suffice to prove the case,
then character is not an essential element.
Rather, for 405(b) to apply, the substantive law requires that someone’s character must
be proven, as an element of the charge, claim, or defense. In the very rare situation that
character is such an essential element, the most probative—and the most time-consuming—
method of proof is permitted: proof by specific instances. One might reasonably wonder why
Rule 404 says nothing on this topic and instead it is hidden away in 405(b). The answer is that
Rule 404 does not exclude such “essential element” evidence, because it is not offered to prove
action in conformity with character, but to prove character itself.
In negligent hiring or retention cases, the plaintiff must show that the employer knew
or should have known of the employee’s bad character for the pertinent trait. In such cases, the
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plaintiff may prove the employee’s character by reputation or opinion evidence or by evidence of
specific acts by the employee, or any combination of the three.
I.

Other Sexual Conduct of Plaintiff: Rule 412’s “Rape Shield,” Extended in
1994 to Civil Cases
1.

Was the sexual advance by the alleged harasser unwelcome to the
plaintiff?

Rule 412(b)(2) tips strongly against admissibility of other sexual conduct by the
plaintiff. The Rule provides:
In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these
rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and
of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim’s reputation is admissible
only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.
Rule 412(b)(2)’s balancing test is the opposite of Rule 403’s (if probative value and risk of unfair
prejudice are equal, the Rule 403 test would keep the evidence in, but Rule 412 excludes it; Rule
412, the more specific of the two, governs as to 412 issues). As under Rule 609)b), the evidence
is in under 412 only if its proponent shows that its probative value “substantially outweighs” the
countervailing risks. See Note, But She Spoke in an Un-Ladylike Fashion!: Parsing Through
the Standards of Evidentiary Admissibility in Civil Lawsuits After the 1994 Amendments to the
Rape Shield Law, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 661 (2009).
Evidence of a plaintiff’s behavior at the defendant’s workplace is the type most likely
to be admissible.
● Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 643-47 (8th Cir. 2006) (district
court’s admission of plaintiff’s workplace behavior including her “sexually
explicit language,” her comments about “vibrators and men’s sex organs,” and her
speaking in a “rude, lewd, and unlady-like fashion,” while she worked with
alleged harassers was proper).
● B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversible error to
admit evidence of sexual harassment plaintiff’s out-of-workplace speech to
coworker and her conduct at her home in front of him and a fellow officer;
instruction to disregard did not cure error).
● Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2000) (harmless error to admit
evidence, on issue whether plaintiff was injured by display of pornography at
work, that she had voluntarily viewed pornography outside the workplace).
● Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1998)
(district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of plaintiff’s
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alleged promiscuity and the marital status of her boyfriend, but admitting
evidence that her relationship distracted her from work and, on issue whether
advances were unwelcome, evidence that she flirted with allegedly harassing
customer).
● Saffa v. Oklahoma Oncology, Inc., 405 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1285-86, 1290-91 (D.
Utah 2005) (pretrial ruling excluding evidence of sexual harassment plaintiff’s
consensual sexual relationship with another doctor five years earlier, before
plaintiff was employed by defendant, when doctor was separated from his wife;
there was no evidence that alleged harasser knew of this relationship, but ruling
that if plaintiff called the earlier doctor to testify, their relationship would be
relevant to credibility; also ruling that if plaintiff testified at trial that “she never
thinks in terms of affairs,” as she has in deposition testimony, the testimony [will
be] relevant for impeachment”; further, evidence of plaintiff’s conduct, and
statements regarding the alleged harasser at the employer’s Christmas party, will
be admissible, with regard to whether his remarks had offended her and with
regard to her claim of emotional distress).
As to a plaintiff’s having previously made similar but false allegations, cf. Note, The Girl
Who Cried Wolf: Missouri’s New Approach to Evidence of Prior False Allegations, 70 MO. L.
REV. 813 (2005) (suggesting balancing test that would have been appropriate for the court to
have adopted in State v. Long, 140 S.W.3d 27 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)).
2.

What is “sexual behavior or sexual predisposition”?

The Advisory Committee note to Rule 412 explains:
Past sexual behavior connotes all activities that involve actual physical conduct, i.e.,
sexual intercourse and sexual contact, or that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact.
* * * In addition, the word ‘behavior’ should be construed to include activities of the
mind, such as fantasies or dreams. * * * This amendment is designed to exclude
evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent
believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder. Admission of such evidence
would contravene Rule 412’s objectives of shielding the alleged victim from potential
embarrassment and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical thinking. Consequently,
unless the (b)(2) exception is satisfied, evidence such as that relating to the alleged
victim’s mode of dress, speech, or life-style will not be admissible.
● Jaros v. Lodgenet Entertainment Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2002)
(evidence of harassment plaintiff’s “suggestive clothes” was properly excluded),
abrogated on other grounds, Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129
(2004).
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3.

Notice and Procedure

● Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(sanctioning defendant for failing to follow procedural requirement of submitting
matters under seal by excluding evidence of co-workers’ testimony regarding
plaintiff’s sexual conversations at workplace other than with alleged harasser).
4.

How does Rule 412 affect discovery?

The Advisory Committee Note states:
[D]iscovery of a victim’s past sexual conduct or predisposition in civil cases . . . will be
continued to be governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. In order not to undermine the rationale
of Rule 412, however, courts should enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality.
* * * In an action for sexual harassment, for instance, while some evidence of the alleged
victim’s sexual behavior and/or predisposition in the workplace may perhaps be relevant,
non-work place conduct will usually be irrelevant.
See Note, Unfolding Discovery Issues that Plague Sexual Harassment Cases, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 991 (2006) (discussing, inter alia, Rule 25 court-ordered mental examinations);
Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Laboratory, 171 F.R.D. 179 (D.Md.
1997) (Grimm, J.); Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Hawaii 1996)
(granting motion for protective order); Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(granting motion for protective order).
5.

May the defense circumvent the protections of Rule 412 by offering
evidence of what the alleged harasser had heard about the plaintiff, to
show the alleged harasser’s absence of invidious intent when, say,
making a sexually explicit remark?

See United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 391 & 392 n.1 (4th Cir. 1991) (Rule 412
plainly “manifests the policy that it is unreasonable for a defendant to base his belief of consent
on the victim’s past sexual experiences with third persons. . . .”).
V.

HEARSAY
A.

Is the Evidence Offered for a Hearsay Purpose? Rules 801(a)-(c)

Hearsay = an out-of-court statement (by the “hearsay declarant”) + that is offered today
at trial to prove that what the declarant said when making that statement was factually
accurate (“OCS” + “TOMA” = HS).
● Mack v. ST Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc., 195 Fed. Appx. 829, 842 (11th
Cir. 2006) (plaintiff’s testimony that supervisor did not tell him he was required to
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see someone else about harassment policy was not hearsay, as he did not testify to
a statement).
“Out-of-court” means that the evidence offered today at trial is of a statement made
by any person somewhere else at another time. The other place may even have been another
court proceeding. It is still “out-of-court” EVEN IF THE DECLARANT IS AT TRIAL
TESTIFYING TO HIS OR HER OWN EARLIER STATEMENT.
If the evidence offered includes an “OCS” of a person, it is hearsay only if it is offered at
trial to prove “TOMA.” TOMA = the truth of some fact, or matter, that was being asserted
by the declarant before trial, at the time the declarant made the out-of-court statement.
“Statement” may include an implied assertion from an utterance in words, if the utterance
appears to have been intended by the declarant, at the time the declarant made the utterances, as
an assertion of the fact the evidence is offered at trial to prove.
Steps in analysis:
1. Identify all the out-of-court declarants in the evidence being offered.
2. What was each declarant asserting at the time s/he made the OCS?
3. For what purpose, to help to prove what relevant fact, is the proponent
offering the evidence at trial?
4. It’s hearsay only if the proponent is asking the jury to rely on what the
declarant said in his/her OCS as true, accurate, correct.
See, e.g., Matthews v. Wisconsin Energy Corp., 534 F.3d 547, 557 (7th
Cir. 2008).
5. Evidence of an OCS is hearsay if it will help to prove what it is offered to prove,
only if our thought process to make the OCS relevant must be “Declarant
wouldn’t have said this, unless it was true.”
6. On the other hand, if it is relevant simply that the OCS was made, regardless
whether the OCS was true, it is nonhearsay. In this event, the person testifying
to the OCS can be fully cross-examined as to whether the OCS was made as s/he
has testified.
B.

Significant Relevance for a Nonhearsay Purpose Avoids the Exclusionary
Hearsay Rule 802

If a hearsay objection is made, and the evidence appears to contain an OCS of a person,
the burden falls to the proponent of the evidence to explain to the court how the evidence either
(1) is nonhearsay or (2) falls within a hearsay exception.
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If counsel can come up with a significant, relevant, nonhearsay purpose for admitting an
out-of-court statement, the hearsay rule (Rules 802 and 801(a)-(c)) will not exclude it.
The judge will consider the effectiveness of a Rule 105 limiting instruction in
determining whether to exclude the evidence under Rule 403, but if the nonhearsay purpose goes
to a significant, and not-stipulated-to-, issue in the case, the evidence should come in.
C.

Frequently Relevant Nonhearsay Purposes

If offered for a nonhearsay purpose, a limiting instruction under Rule 105 is appropriate.
1.

Notice to, or effect on, hearer or reader
a.

To show reader or hearer’s knowledge and thus how that
knowledge affected his or her conduct

● See Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113, 120-24 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(reversing its decision to admit evidence of plaintiff’s extra-marital affair with
supervisor at an earlier place of employment, when it was not shown that the
alleged harasser had heard of it).
● U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1035 (W.D.
Wis. 2009) (e-mail sent by a client of the defendant temporary staffing agency,
declining to hire hearing-impaired worker, in response to agency’s e-mail
referring hearing-impaired worker as potential job candidate and warning clientemployer about hearing impairment, was not inadmissible hearsay in ADA action
filed by EEOC; it was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted by the
client, but rather to show the effect the e-mail had on the agency).
● B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1095-97 (9th Cir. 2002) (statements
made by plaintiff of which alleged harasser was aware)
When the plaintiff alleges retaliation for her complaint about illegal activity, her
complaint is relevant to show that the defendant knew she had complained, rather than to prove
that her complaint was true.
● E.g., Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Iweala v. Operational
Technologies Services, Inc., 634 F.Supp.2d 73, 83 (D.D.C. 2009). See Holbrook
v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for
employee, where plaintiff had made no showing that person who took adverse
action against her knew of her complaint).
When the plaintiff alleges that the employer was on notice that the allegedly
discriminating supervisor or co-worker had committed similar acts against others in the past
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and the employer had taken inadequate curative steps, evidence that the employer had been told
of the earlier acts is relevant for a nonhearsay purpose.
● See Green v. Administration of Tulane Educational Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 660 (5th
Cir. 2002); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001)
(evidence of supervisor’s sexual harassment of others was properly admitted as
relevant to issue of defendant-employer’s deliberate indifference to and
condonation of his conduct, as well as arguably relevant to one or more Rule
404(b) purposes with regard to defendant-supervisor himself).
● Deters v. Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc., 202 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.
2000) (evidence of perpetrator’s sexual harassment of another female employee
than plaintiff was properly admitted to show notice to employer); Bailey v. USF
Holland, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 831 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) (inadequate steps taken to
remedy hostile work environment).
● Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga.
1996) (in a Title VII sexual harassment suit against a corporate employer, in order
for evidence of defendant’s agent’s prior sexual misconduct to be admissible
under Rule 415, the “evidence of defendant’s agent’s misconduct must be both
probative in that it proves corporate knowledge of similar misconduct and it must
corroborate plaintiff’s story; otherwise, the prejudicial effect on the jury is not
substantially outweighed”).
The defendant also may offer evidence of complaints it received about the plaintiff, not
for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show its good faith
● E.g., Velez v. Thermo King de Puerto Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 445 n.1 (1st Cir.
2009); Maday v. Public Libraries, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007).
b.

Statements made to plaintiff, creating an abusive work
environment

● E.g., Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 2006) (coworker’s references to plaintiff as a “bitch,” etc., were not offered for their truth;
exclusion was harmless error).
● Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 1999).
● Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (co-worker had given plaintiff
an anonymous note that stated, “I cried over you last night and I’m totally drained
today,” and mailed her a letter that stated: “I know that you are worth knowing
with or without sex. . . . I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months.
Watching you. Experiencing you from O so far away.”).
● Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113, 115-16 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
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2.

Circumstantial evidence of out-of-court declarant’s state of mind or
knowledge

● E.g., Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 444 F.Supp.2d 831, 844 n.5 & 848 (M.D. Tenn.
2006).
● See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (evidence of
employer’s treatment of employees of different race then plaintiff is “[e]specially
relevant” to whether employer’s proffered explanation is pretextual.
Q8:

Does the hearsay rule exclude this evidence? HR director: “[Job
applicant’s] mother died from colon cancer.”
● See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg et
seq., which went into effect in late 2009.

Q9:

Constructive discharge case: plaintiff offers her statements, “You all are so
vicious to me. Working here is like working in hell!”
● See, e.g., Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
● Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 444 F.Supp.2d 831, 850 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) (hostile
work environment plaintiffs’ statements circumstantially showing their awareness
of use of racial epithets).
3.

The prior statement is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony at trial
and is offered only to impeach the declarant (Rule 613)

● E.g., United States v. Watkins, 591 F.3d 780, 787 (5th Cir. 2009).
4.

The making of the prior statement is itself an improper discriminatory
act, and is offered not for its truth, but as a “verbal act” or legally
operative fact

● Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 444 F.Supp.2d 831, 847, 849 (M.D. Tenn. 2006)
(racial epithets used against the plaintiffs at the workplace).
D.

Out-of-Court Statements Admissible for Their Truth: Rules 801(d), 803-804,
807
1.

Rule 801(d)(2): Statement of a Party Opponent

The defense may offer plaintiff’s statements for their truth and vice-versa.
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a.

Admissible:

When are a co-worker’s or supervisor’s statements admissible
against the employer, for their truth, under 801(d)(2)(D) as
statements made during the employment or agency relationship
and concerning a matter within the scope of that employment or
agency?

E.g., Tisa v. Beasley FM Acquisition Corp., 343 Fed. Appx. 793 (3d Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (declarant was employee’s “ ‘agent independent contractor,’ see
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421,
1434-39 (3d Cir. 1994), who had a ‘heavy hand in operations’ ”).

● Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 444 F.Supp.2d 831, 850 (M.D. Tenn. 2006)
(supervisor’s statement, refusing to take action about co-workers’ use of racial
epithets against plaintiffs).
Inadmissible: E.g., Ramirez v. The GEO Group, Inc., 655 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1179-80 (D. Colo.
2009) (no evidence that declarant commenting as to ground for plaintiff’s
termination had any part in the decision-making process).
● Di Giovanna v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 651 F.Supp.2d 193, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(in employee’s suit alleging FMLA violation, statement of co-worker who had
nothing to do with any decisions regarding plaintiff’s FMLA leave).
● Young v. James Green Management, Inc., 327 F.3d 616, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Rule 801(d)(2)(D) not applicable to statements made by defendant’s employee in
letter of resignation).
b.

Under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), a party also may adopt another’s
statement as his or her own

E.g., United States v. McKinney, 345 Fed. Appx. 206 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (defendant adopted truth of child’s statement, by admitting that he had molested
her).
2.

Rule 803(3): Statements by declarant directly asserting his or her
present state of mind at the time of the statement

In hostile environment cases, not only must the plaintiff show that a “reasonable person”
would find the environment abusive, but that also must have been the plaintiff’s subjective
feeling. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880
(9th Cir. 1991).
Q10: Hostile work environment plaintiff complains to co-worker, “I can’t stand it
here. I am upset all the time.” Response to a hearsay objection?
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E.

Rule 805: Double/Multiple Hearsay

If the statement offered is that of one out-of-court declarant who was repeating another
out-of-court statement by himself or another person, a hearsay exception (or relevant nonhearsay
purpose) must be shown to apply for each statement in order to admit both.
● E.g., Nyack v. Southern Connecticut State Univ., 424 F.Supp.2d 370, 374-76 (D.
Conn. 2006) (three proffered “double hearsay” statements were admissible against
defendant as statements by its agent, under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), because both
declarants exercised supervisory authority over the plaintiff; a fourth was
excluded, because the employee who repeated the supervisor’s statement was
“outside the personnel decisionmaking hierarchy governing [plaintiff’s]
conduct”).
Double hearsay, multiple-declarant issues often arise as to documents offered as business
records under Rule 803(6). If a person whose statement is offered for its truth is not a part of the
business, another route around the hearsay rule must be found for that statement.
The same is true for EEOC determinations offered under Rule 803(8)(C). The term
“factual findings” in 803(8)(C) has been interpreted not to embrace hearsay that was the basis for
such findings. E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 551 n.6 (5th Cir.
1990) (“Though factual findings are admitted by Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C), hearsay statements
contained in the report are not.”). To admit such other hearsay, another hearsay exception or a
nonhearsay purpose must be cited.
Of course, factual findings appearing to be unreliable ought be excluded either under the
final clause at the end of Rule 803(8)(C) if the opponent shows that they are unreliable, e.g.,
Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290 (3d Cir. 1994), or, in the court’s discretion, the EEOC
determination may be excluded under Rule 403. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,
167 (1988).
Q11: Are EEOC personnel experts, so that hearsay that they “reasonably relied
on” may be admitted, in their reports, for a limited purpose under Rule 703?
● See Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1345 (3d Cir. 2002) (EEOC
reports are not “expert opinion evidence”; no abuse of discretion in excluding
report under Rule 403).
VI.

AUTHENTICATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA: RULES 901-902
A.

Lorraine

For a complete run-down, see Judge Grimm’s opinion in Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins.
Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007).
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B.

E-Mail
● U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1033-34
(W.D. Wis. 2009) (testimony of human resources manager of employer, who
personally retrieved from employee’s computer an e-mail purporting to come
from defendant, adequately authenticated it; “[Defendant] Olsten argues that only
the author of the e-mails may authenticate them, but cites no authority for this
proposition and assumes incorrectly that a witness must have personal knowledge
of the contents of a document in order to authenticate it. If Olsten were correct,
then e-mails would be inadmissible in any case in which the purported author
denied their accuracy. The rules of evidence are not so punctilious. * * *
Testimony from someone who personally retrieved the e-mail from the computer
to which the e-mail was allegedly sent is sufficient for this purpose. further, as
the EEOC observes, even without a custodian, e-mails may be authenticated
through the e-mail addresses in the headers and other circumstantial evidence,
such as the location where the e-mail was found.”) (emphasis in original; citations
omitted).
● See Rules 901(b)(1) and (4).

C.

Internet
● Safer, Inc. v. OMS Investments, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1039 (U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Office, Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 2010) (Board will deem a
document obtained from the Internet, “identifying its date of publication or date
that it was accessed and printed, and its source (e.g., the URL),” as genuine).
● Griffin v. State, ___ A.2d ___, 2010 WL ____ (Md. App. May 27, 2010) (Sept.
Term 2008, No. 1132) (no error in admitting MySpace page as sufficiently
authenticated by circumstantial evidence, including photo, birth date, and
nickname, as belonging to murder defendant’s girlfriend; page contained a threat
against “snitches,” and was admitted to corroborate state’s witness’s testimony as
to why he had not identified defendant at his first trial).
● See Rule 901(b)(4).

VII.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A.

Interlocutory Appeal of Privilege Rulings

Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2009), held that trial
court orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under
the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
In Mohawk Industries, the employee had sued his employer, alleging that he had been
fired to prevent him from testifying about the employer’s hiring of illegal aliens. The trial court
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had ordered the employer to disclose information related to the employee’s pre-termination
interview with the employer’s attorney.
Q12. What are the ramifications of the Mohawk Industries decision? If the trial
court finds, for example, that a defendant employer’s reliance on an internal
investigation has waived its attorney-client privilege, what can defense
counsel do?
And what are counsel’s ethical obligations, if counsel believes that the trial court’s
ruling is legally incorrect? Should counsel refuse to comply, so as to be held in civil
contempt?
● See, e.g., In re Fannie Mae Securities Litig., 552 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(affirming contempt sanction for failure to comply with discovery deadline).
B.

Applicability of Work Product

The circuits remain divided on the applicability of the work product doctrine to papers
like tax-accrual documents, which provide legal assessments of how much money a company
should put aside for possible tax liability.
The First Circuit held, en banc, that such papers and others are unprotected as attorney
work product (they had been too widely distributed to be protected by the attorney-client
privilege), unless they were prepared specifically for litigation, and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in that case. United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009)
(en banc), cert. denied, 2010 WL 2025145 (U.S. May 24, 2010).
VIII. SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: ADVERSE INFERENCE – EMPLOYER’S
OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE POSSIBLE E-MAIL EVIDENCE WHEN
FACING LITIGATION
A person’s spoliation of evidence gives rise to a permissible adverse inference of “guilty
knowledge,” offered to prove the truth of that person’s implied assertion, “I did something
wrong, and I need to hide it.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(f), as amended effective December 1, 2006, precludes an adverse
inference when loss of evidence was “a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system.”
● Pension Committee of University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Bank of Am. Sec.
Litig., 685 F.Supp.2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (imposing sanctions on plaintiffs who
all were either negligent or grossly negligent due to their failure “to timely
institute written litigation holds and engag[ing] in careless and indifferent
collection efforts after the duty to preserve arose,” which caused loss or
destruction of some documents). Judge Sheila Scheindlin wrote:
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After a discovery duty is well established, the failure to adhere to
contemporary standards can be considered gross negligence. Thus, after
the final relevant Zubulake opinion in July, 2004, the following failures
support a finding of gross negligence, when the duty to preserve has
attached: to issue a written litigation hold; to identify all of the key players
and to ensure that their electronic and paper records are preserved; to
cease the deletion of e-mail or to preserve the records of former employees
that are in a party’s possession, custody, or control; and to preserve
backup tapes when they are the sole source of relevant information or
when they relate to key players, if the relevant information maintained by
those players is not obtainable from readily accessible sources.
She imposed monetary sanctions on and adverse inferences as to all the plaintiffs.
The jury instruction regarding only those plaintiffs she found to be grossly
negligent informed the jury that it might “presume” that any lost evidence would
have been favorable to the defendants (but that the presumption was rebuttable).
● Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 645
253 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2010) (in Fifth Circuit, unlike in Second Circuit, no
adverse inference arises when party is negligent or grossly negligent; “As a
general rule, in this circuit, the severe sanctions of granting default judgment,
striking pleadings, or giving adverse inference instructions may not be imposed
unless there is evidence of ‘bad faith.’ ”) (emphasis added). Judge Rosenthal
found that the defendants, former employees, had intentionally and in bad faith
spoliated documents, reviewed the varying rules among all the other circuits, as
well (nn. 10-13 and accompanying text).
● Thompson v. HUD, 219 F.R.D. 93 (D. Md. 2003) (imposing sanctions but not
adverse inference instruction).
● Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), subsequent
proceeding, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Defendant’s personnel deleted
e-mails after a gender discrimination lawsuit had been filed, “even though they
had received at least two directions from counsel not to.” The court imposed an
adverse inference instruction, awarded reimbursement of costs of redeposing
individuals, and awarded attorneys’ fees for a sanctions motion. Counsel has a
duty “to effectively communicate” discovery obligations to the client, and “once
the duty to preserve attaches, counsel must identify sources of discoverable
information.” Counsel “must put in place a litigation hold, and make that known
to all relevant employees by communicating with them directly.” This includes
stopping any routine e-mail deletion, as well as routine destruction of “back up
tapes.”
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IX.

QUON’S EVIDENTIARY IMPLICATIONS
A.

Cert. Granted in Quon, a Text Messaging Case

As stated by Judge Wardlaw, writing for a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Quon:
The recently minted standard of electronic communication via e-mails, text
messages, and other means opens a new frontier in Fourth Amendment
jurisdiction that has been little explored. Here, we must first answer the threshold
question: Do users of text messaging services . . . have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their text messages stored on the service provider’s network? We
hold that they do.
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904, 91 Empl. Prac. Dec. P. 43,233, 155
Lab.Cas. P 60,628 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, 554 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied sub nom. USA Mobility Wireless, Inc. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2009) (No.
08-1472), cert. granted sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2009)
(No. 08-1332), oral argument, 2010 WL 154005 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2010).
B.

The Decision Below

The Ninth Circuit held that a public employer, a California city police department, had,
as a matter of law, violated its employees’ Fourth Amendment rights under the facts of the case.
The city contracted with Arch Wireless to provide text-messaging services, and issued
pagers to twenty-two employees, including police sergeant Quon. Under the contract, the city
would have to pay monthly overage charges for any pager that texted more than 25,000
characters that month. Sergeant Quon was told that they city’s “Computer Usage, Internet, and
E-Mail Policy,” which he had earlier signed, and which provided that the users “should have no
expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources,” extended to the pager text
messages. But when he exceeded 25,000 characters, the police lieutenant in charge told him that
he would not audit his messages if Sgt. Quon personally paid for the overage.
After several months in which Sgt. Quon had overages and the lieutenant’s informal
policy was followed, the police chief decided to see whether the department should contract for a
higher monthly allotment than 25,000 characters. He ordered the lieutenant to obtain and audit
transcripts to see how many characters were being used for official, rather than personal, matters.
In response to the city’s (the subscriber’s) request, Arch Wireless released to the city
transcripts of Sgt. Quon’s sent and received messages—including sexually explicit messages
among the sergeant, his wife, a fellow male sergeant, and a female police dispatcher. Sgt. Quon
and the people with whom he “texted” sued.
The Ninth Circuit first held that the district court had erred as a matter of law in not
granting the plaintiffs’ summary judgment against Arch Wireless under the Stored
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Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1986), part of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act. The district court had erroneously held that Arch Wireless was a “remote
computing service,” so that it could release private communication with the consent of the
subscriber. Rather, Arch was an “electronic communication service,” which under the Act could
release private information only to, or with the lawful consent of, “an addressee or intended
recipient of such communication.”
Next—and this is the issue on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari—the Ninth
Circuit held that the district court erred in not having granted summary judgment for Sgt.
Quon and the others on the ground that their Fourth Amendment rights (and their privacy
rights under the California Constitution, construed in pari material) had been violated by the
city and their employer, the police department.
The Ninth Circuit reached the following decisions:
1.

Reasonableness of expectation of privacy

The plaintiffs had “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their text
messages vis-a-vis the service provider.” They could not reasonably expect privacy as to the
“address” of their messages (analogizing to the address on a mailed envelope or the numbers
dialed on a phone). And had Sgt. Quon consented to the audit, his correspondents would have
had no claim. But they “had a reasonable expectation that the Department would not review
their messages absent consent from either a sender or recipient of the text messages.”
Due to the informal policy followed within the police department, Sgt. Quon had a
reasonable expectation of privacy from intrusion by his employer. “[T]he fact that a hypothetical
member of the public [might] request Quon’s text messages [under the California Public Records
Act] might slightly diminish his expectation of privacy in the messages, [but] it does not make
his belief in the privacy of the text messages objectively unreasonable.”
2.

Reasonableness of the search

The jury had found that the department’s purpose in auditing the text messages was to
determine whether the character limit should be raised above 25,000, so as “to ensure that
officers were not being required to pay for work-related expenses.” The Ninth Circuit found this
to be “a legitimate work-related rationale. . . .” But it found that, as a matter of law, “the search
was not reasonable in scope,” as there was:
a host of simple ways to verify the efficacy of the 25,000 character limit (if that,
indeed, was the intended purpose) without intruding on Appellants’ Fourth
Amendment rights. For example, the Department could have warned Quon that
for the month of September he was forbidden from using his pager for personal
communications, and that the contents of all of his messages would be reviewed
to ensure the pager was used only for work-related purposes during that time
frame. Alternatively, if the Department wanted to review past usage, it could
have asked Quon to count the characters himself, or asked him to redact personal
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messages and grant permission to the Department to review the redacted
transcript. Under this process, Quon would have an incentive to be truthful
because he may have previously paid for work-related overages and presumably
would want the limit increased to avoid paying for such overages in the future.
* * * Instead, the Department opted to review the contents of all the messages,
work-related and personal, without the consent of Quon or the remaining
Appellants. This was excessively intrusive in light of the noninvestigatory object
of the search, and because Appellants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
those messages, the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
C.

Arizona Public Records Requests: Metadata is to Be Disclosed

In Lake v. City of Phoenix, 222 Ariz. 547, 218 P.3d 1004, 107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1142 (2009) (en banc), the Supreme Court of Arizona held that a police officer seeking
the electronic version of public records, his supervisor’s notes on the officer’s work
performance, is entitled to disclosure, under the Arizona public records statute, of the electronic
version of the record, including any embedded “inherent or ‘application’ metadata.” The
officer suspected that the paper copies provided to him had been backdated.
Justice Bales, writing for a unanimous court, reasoned:
The metadata in an electronic document is part of the underlying
document; it does not stand on its own. When a public officer uses a computer to
make a public record, the metadata forms part of the document as much as the
words on the page. Arizona’s public records law requires that the requestor be
allowed to review a copy of the “real record.” It would be illogical, and contrary
to the policy of openness underlying the public records laws, to conclude that
public entities can withhold information embedded in an electronic document,
such as the date of creation, while they would be required to produce the same
information if it were written manually on a paper public record.
We accordingly hold that when a public entity maintains a public record in
an electronic format, the electronic version of the record, including any embedded
metadata, is subject to disclosure under our public records law.
Our decision is unlikely to result in the “administrative nightmare” that the
City envisions. A public entity is not required to spend “countless hours”
identifying metadata; instead, it can satisfy a public records request merely by
providing the requestor with a copy of the record in its native format.
Additionally, not every public records request will require disclosure of the native
file. Public entities may provide paper copies if the nature of the request
precludes any need for the electronic version. Public records requests that are
unduly burdensome or harassing can be addressed under existing law, which
recognizes that disclosure may be refused based on concerns of privacy,
confidentiality, or the best interests of the state.
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We do not here decide when a public entity is required to retain public
records in electronic format. That a public record currently exists in an electronic
format, and is subject to disclosure in that format, does not itself determine
whether there is a statutory obligation to preserve it electronically.
(Citations omitted.)
D.

More on Discovery—and Privacy—in the Digital Age

Was the alleged harasser or the plaintiff where he or she claims to have been? See
Wong, Online Trail Fraught with Risks, BALT. SUN, Mar. 19, 2010, at 18A (“Experts say it’s one
thing to use social media to talk about a movie or your meal. It’s another to let the digital
universe know that you are, say, at New York’s LaGuardia Airport right now and not at home.
Many people remain complacent about using online privacy settings. An added complication of
these applications is that they link up with Facebook and Twitter, allowing a larger audience to
see location-based updates. This month, Twitter introduced its own location-based feature and
Facebook is expected to do the same.”).
● See also Bahadur, Electronic Discovery, Informational Privacy, Facebook and
Utopian Civil Justice, 79 MISS. L.J. 317 (2009) (proposing an expansion of “the
information-sharing model” created by Rule 502(d) and the related amendments
to the Fed.R.Civ.P.).
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